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Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state law claims, brought by a group of Texas farmers, alleging that one of Dow's pesticides damaged their peanut crop.[1]

Background

A group of 29 peanut farmers in Texas alleged that their peanut crops were severely damaged by Dow's "Strongarm" pesticide.[2] After the farmers informed Dow that they intended to file a lawsuit, Dow filed a request in federal district court for a declaratory judgment stating that a legal claim brought by the farmers would be preempted by FIFRA.[3] The farmers then filed counterclaims against Dow, which alleged tort claims and violations of consumer protection laws.[4] The district court granted Dow's motion for summary judgment and found that all but one of the farmers' claims were preempted by FIFRA.[5] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.[6] In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the extent to which FIFRA preempts claims under state law.[7]

Opinion of the Court

In an opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the farmers' claims were not preempted by FIFRA.[8] Justice Stevens wrote that "[n]othing in the text of FIFRA would prevent a State from making the violation of a federal labeling or packaging requirement a state offense, thereby imposing its own sanctions on pesticide manufacturers who violate federal law."[9] Justice Stevens also distinguished the facts of this case from those in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,[10] noting that FIFRA "prohibits only state-law labeling and packaging requirements that are “in addition to or different from” the labeling and packaging requirements under FIFRA."[11]

Concurring and dissenting opinions

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize "the importance of the [Environmental Protection] [A]gency's role in overseeing FIFRA's future implementation".[12] Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.[13] Justice Thomas argued that "[a] state-law cause of action, even if not specific to labeling, nevertheless imposes a labeling requirement 'in addition to or different from' FIFRA's when it attaches liability to statements on the label that do not produce liability under FIFRA."[14]

See also

References

  1. ^ Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 434 (2005).
  2. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 434.
  3. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 435 (noting that the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.01 et seq. (West 2002), required the farmers to provide notice).
  4. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 435-36.
  5. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 436 ("rejecting one claim on state-law grounds and dismissing the remainder as expressly pre-empted by 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)").
  6. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 436.
  7. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 436-37.
  8. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 444 ("petitioners’ claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty are not pre-empted").
  9. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 442.
  10. ^ Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
  11. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 447.
  12. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 454-55 (Breyer, J., concurring).
  13. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 455 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
  14. ^ Bates, 544 U.S. at 456 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).